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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH

THE REPUBLIC GROUP. INC..
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant
CASE NO. 920330-CA
vs.
Argument Priority 15
WON-DOOR CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation,
REED A. WATKINS,
JAY A. SMART. RON SMART.
and DOES 1 THROUGH 20,
Defendants-Appellees
BRIEF OF APPELLEES
Appeal from a Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court
for Salt Lake County, Honorable Scott Daniels, District Judge

JURISDICTION
This appeal is from two final orders of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, entered November 4, 1991 and November 5, 1991.
Appellant The Republic Group, Inc. ("Republic") initially filed the appeal incorrectly
with this Court on December 3,1991 (No. 910721-CA). On January 15, 1992 this appeal
1

was transferred to the Utah Supreme Court (No. 920029), which had jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(?)(j) (1992). On May 22, 1992, the Utah Supreme
Court poured over this appeal to this Court for disposition (No. 920330-CA). The
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this appeal therefore rests upon its pour-over
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1992).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The broad issue on appeal is whether the trial court correctly concluded that
there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Defendants are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On
appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the appellate court views the facts
and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion;
it reviews the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness, including its conclusion that
there are no genuine issues of material fact.1 Each of the issues below involve the
determination of mixed issues of law and fact, and therefore the foregoing standard of
review applies to each of the issues presented below.
1.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that any and all disputes,

representations and prior agreements between Won-Door and Republic were merged
into the August 22, 1986 Agreement.

•^-Neiderhausar
P.2d

1193

(Utah Ct.

Builders
App.

& Development
1992).

2

Corp.

v.

Campbell,

824

2.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that the August 22,1986 Agreement

was the controlling and binding agreement between the parties.2
3.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that Won-Door did not breach the

August 22, 1986 Agreement.
4.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that no breach of the duty of good

faith and fair dealing occurred because no contract existed between Republic and WonDoor at the time of the alleged breach.
5.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that a breach could not have

occurred in any event on August 22,1986 because the list of qualified buyers had already
been determined in May of 1986 and were not then negotiable.
6.

Is Republic's claim for promissory estoppel reviewable on appeal where

it failed to allege such a cause of action in its complaint, and in any event are they
merged into the August 22, 1986 agreement.
7.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that as a matter of law defendants

were entitled to summary judgment on Republic's claims for fraud.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
This case was decided on summary judgment. Therefore, Rule 56, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure is determinative.3

2

See Record at 415.

3

See Addendum J.
3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
Republic filed its Complaint in this case on June 14, 1988, claiming that
Defendants owe it a finder's fee for Republic's identification of Thermal Systems, Inc.,
a subsidiary of TS Industries, Inc., the company that eventually purchased all of the stock
of Won-Door.4 The Complaint alleges three causes of action, breach of contract, breach
of a contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing, and fraud.5 Defendants answered
the Complaint, denied liability, and affirmatively defended on the basis that all
negotiations, contacts, discussions, representations, and agreements, if any, relied upon
by Republic were superseded by the August 22,1986 Agreement which entitled Republic
to a fee only if Won-Door was sold to one of the companies described in the August 22,
1986 Agreement, which did not occur.6
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on September 11, 1990.7
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on or about October 16, 1990.8
On October 30, 1990, Defendants filed a Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Irvin D. Bird,
Bryant Cragun and Mark McSwain, which were submitted by Plaintiff in opposition to

4

Record at 2-22.

5

Record at 2-22.

6

Record at 34-54.

7

Record at 97.

8

Record at 492.

4

Defendants' motion for summary judgment and in support of its own motion.9 This
motion was granted in part and denied in part.10 The trial court heard oral argument
on these motions on August 12, 1991.11 Judge Daniels granted Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment and denied Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.12
This is an appeal from the District Court's Orders of November 4 and 5, 1991, which
granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Plaintiffs Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.13

9

Record at 198

10

Record at 323-25, 337-38. The Affidavit of Bryant Cragun
which appears in the record (R. 189-95) is neither signed nor
notarized. As such, it is inadmissible as evidence in this case.
Rules 11, 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Utah Code Ann. § 7826-5 (1990).
1:I

Record at 350-416.

12
13

Record at 329-33, 415.

Record at 329-33.

5

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are undisputed in the record from the trial court:

THE PARTIES
1.

Plaintiff-Appellant The Republic Group, Inc. ("Republic") is a Utah

corporation15 with experience in corporate mergers and in finding investors16, and in
1988 had been involved in perhaps fifty such transactions.17

±q

A review of the Statement of Facts set forth in Republic's
Brief at pp. 3-14 reveals numerous problems, although none create
genuine issues of material fact.
For example, there is no citation to the detailed "facts"
asserted (some even containing supposed quotations) in Statement of
Facts Nos. 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, and 34. Most of
this asserted matter is nowhere in the record. This violates Rule
24(a)(7), (e) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. State v. Price,
827 P.2d 247 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Also, many of the citations are extremely broad, citing to an
entire 96-page deposition (see footnotes
15, 18), citing to the
entire 12-page Affidavit of Irvin D. Bird, Jr., the 11-page
Affidavit of Mark McSwain, and the 7-page unsigned Affidavit of
Bryant Cragun (see footnotes 2, 5, 6, 9, 22, 24, 25, and 26).
Worse, a number of the citations do not support or only
partially support the matter from which they are cited, or contain
incorrect quotations.
See Statement of Facts Nos. 1 (last
sentence), 3, 9 (see R. 293), 10, 13, 14, 15 (see R. 300), 21 (last
sentence).
15

Record at 2.

16

D e p o s i t i o n of I r v i n D. B i r d , J r . ,

17

Jd, a t

4,9-10.
6

Vol. I , a t 5.

2.

Irvin D. Bird, Jr., ("Bird") was the President of Republic, commencing in

1985, and at all relevant times thereafter.18
3.

Defendant-Appellee Won-Door Corporation ("Won-Door") is a Utah

corporation19 which in 1986 was seeking to raise funding through either an initial public
offering or a private placement of common stock.20
4.

Defendant-Appellee Reed A. Watkins ("Watkins") is a Utah resident and

in February, 1986, Watkins was appointed as the exclusive agent for Won-Door and its
shareholders to raise funding for Won-Door and its shareholders in this manner and to
negotiate and conclude the funding transaction on behalf of Won-Door and its
shareholders.21
5.

Defendants-Appellees Jay A. Smart and Ron Smart (the "Smarts") were

shareholders of Won-Door at all times relevant to this case.22
THE MAY 12, 1986 LETTER AGREEMENT
6.

Watkins contacted Republic in early 1986 and thereafter delivered a letter

dated March 12, 1986 to Republic which established a nonexclusive broker arrangement
whereby Republic would earn a $250,000 commission if it funded, through its contacts,

18

Id.

at 4.

19

Record a t 2.

20

Record a t 16, 279; See Addendum

21

Record a t 16, 279; See Addendum "A".

22

Record a t 3 .
7

M

A".

176,000 shares (22 percent) of the Won-Door stock at $42.00 per share to be sold by
members of the Smart family.23
7.

Bird admitted that Watkins' March 12, 1986 letter "became obsolete"

because its was not possible to sell a 22 percent interest as required by the March 12
Agreement.24
DECISION TO USE LARGER COMPANY TO SELL ALL THE STOCK
8.

Because of Republic's inability to sell the 22 percent of Won-Door, the

shareholders decided to sell all of the Won-Door stock and elected to go with a larger,
more experienced company to accomplish the sale.25 Republic was aware of this and
attempted to get Republic to use Drexel, Burnharn & Lambert to handle the sale of all
the stock of Won-Door.26
9.

On or about April 28, 1986 Won-Door (by Watkins) entered into a written

contract with Boettcher & Company ("Boettcher") whereby Boettcher was named the
exclusive sales agent for the sale of all of the Won-Door stock.27

The contract

specifically excepted ten purchasers previously contacted by intermediaries other than
Boettcher.28

23

Record a t 17, 280, 298; See Addendum "B".

24

Deposition of I r v i n D. Bird, J r . , Vol. I , a t 15, 19, 298.

25

Record a t 294, 298; See Addendum " I " .

26

Record a t 299, 4 8 1 .

27

Record a t 287-92; See Addendum "G"

28

Record a t 290.
8

THE LIST OF QUALIFIED BUYERS
10.

On May 12, 1986, Bryant Cragun, an associate of Republic's, sent a letter

to Republic stating his suggestions for the list of ten qualified buyers to be excluded
from the Boettcher contract.29
11.

In a letter from Republic to Watkins dated May 21, 198630, Republic

listed itself and ten other companies which would be excepted from the Boettcher
agreement.31
12.

Watkins gave the May 21 list to Boettcher, which accepted it and agreed

that the companies on that list would be excepted from the Boettcher contract, even
though there were 11 names including Republic.32
DISAGREEMENTS PRIOR TO THE AUGUST 22 AGREEMENT
13.

Prior to preparation of its May 21, 1986 letter, Republic took "extreme

disagreement" with Watkins in being limited "to only ten companies", 33 and Bird was
having continuing disagreement with Watkins "Maybe once or twice a week, yes.
Whenever we met v/e discussed this issue." M

29

Record a t 293; See Addendum "H".

30

Record a t 18, 281.

31

Deposition of I r v i n D. Bird, J r . , Vol. I , a t 27. Record a t
299; See Addenda "C" and "G"; a l s o see Deposition of I r v i n D. Bird,
J r . , Vol. I I , a t 5-6.
32

Record a t 300.

33

Deposition of I r v i n D. Bird, J r . , Vol. I , a t 28.

34

Id.

a t 28.
9

14.

Bird also testified with respect to time period the week or so before the

May 21 letter was sent to Watkins:
. . .unbeknownst to us, he [Watkins] had made arrangements with
Boettcher to also work on this merger activity, but his arrangement with
Boettcher excluded only ten slots. And we had some great disagreements
with Reed about that, and I guess those disagreements still stand.
We prepared a list; he said, Just give me a list of ten that we can
omit from our agreement with Boettcher. And much to our dismay we
had to do that-or wanted to accommodate Reed to do that even though
other companies that we were working with that were interested
candidates were left off this list, and our continuing argument with Reed
was, what if the other people buy the company, what about our fee
arrangements? And those issues were never resolved, never resolved.
And that occasioned this Exhibit 2, our letter of May 21st to Reed
Watkins.35
15.

Bird and his partners, Fred Volcansek and Mark McSwain, "hammered at

Reed and hammered at Reed, and my partners were insistent" on getting a written fee
agreement, and although there had been numerous discussions with Watkins about
"another fee arrangement when the whole company was sold", the documents "don't
contain anything in concrete. There was never an agreement definitely as to what the
fee agreement clearly was outside of as it relates to the whole 30 companies that we'd
worked with."36
16.

Bird testified that prior to the May 21, 1986 letter, Republic protested to

Watkins about the agreement Watkins made with Boettcher.37
35

Id.

at 27 (emphasis added).

36

Deposition of Irvin D. Bird, Jr., Vol. I, at 36 (emphasis
added).
37

Id.

at 39.

10

17.

In the early months after the expiration of the March 12,1986 Agreement,

Watkins refused to give Republic a fee agreement in writing.38
18.

Bird had numerous discussions with Watkins about the Lehman formula

[calculated on a graduated basis] as the basis for payment of a fee, but admitted that
prior to August 22, 1986, "We never, ever came to a solid fee arrangement as it relates
to all of the companies on all of the lists that we had worked with. . ,."39
19.

Bird claimed there were some nonspecific verbal agreements with Watkins

in regard to the fee,40 but in response to further questioning directed at the time period
from the expiration of the March 12, 1986 Agreement and the May 21, 1986 letter, Bird
admitted that there was no resolution about what the fee would be:
O

[By Mr. Faber] But there was never any resolution as to what that fee
would be?
No, there never was.41

38

Id.

at 50.

39 Id.

a t 51

40

Id.

a t 51

Id.

a t 52,

41

11

MAY 27. 1986 LETTER
20.
companies.42

On or about May 27, 1986 Bird prepared a handwritten list of fifteen
He testified that he prepared this letter because of the continuing

argument with Watkins with whom Bird was "furious".43
21.

Bird told Watkins that if any of the companies listed on the May 27, 1986

list became the purchaser of the Won-Door stock, Republic would have earned a fee,
but admitted that "He [Watkins] didn't agree."44
22.

Bird testified that he told Watkins that Thermal Systems, Inc., one of the

companies named on Bird's May 27, 1986 list (and the subsidiary of the ultimate
purchaser in October, 1986 of all the Won-Door stock)45 "was a very poor company,
one that he [Watkins] shouldn't deal with."46
23.

Bird said that Watkins did not agree to anything on the list on May 27,

1986 and testified as follows:
Q

Now at the time you were in your office and writing this up with
Mr. Watkins present and you were a little unhappy with him, at
that point in time, was there any conversation about what he was
going to do with this list?

42

Deposition of Irvin D. Bird, Jr., Vol. I, at 52; Record at
282-283; See Addendum "D",
43

Deposition of Irvin D. Bird, Jr., Vol. I, at 53.

^4Id.
45

at 56 (emphasis added).

Record at 300-01 .

46

Deposition of Irvin D. Bird, Jr., Vol. I, at
Deposition of Irvin D. Bird, Jr., Vol. II, at 39-40.

12

60; see

A

No. He just wanted to know who the other companies that I was arguing
about were, so that's what I told him.

Q

And you didn't agree to anything on this list, he just said. Give me the list?

A

Uh-huh.

Q

You've got to answer yes or no.

A

Yes.

Q

Okay. And so you gave him the list and he left, I take it?

A

That's correct.

Q

Do you know what he did with the list thereafter?

A

No. I don't have a remote idea . . .47
LIST OF TEN QUALIFIED COMPANIES

24.

In August, 1986 Republic instructed its attorney, Douglas J. Parry [an

associate of Dan Berman], to send Watkins a letter which was dated August 20, 1986,48
in regard to the identity of the companies for which Republic could claim a fee if WonDoor was sold to any of such companies, and to conclude a fee agreement between
Republic and Won-Door.49

Parry's letter mentions Leucadia and the other ten

companies listed on the May 21, 1986 letter.50

47

Deposition of I r v i n D. Bird, J r . , Vol. I , a t 62-63 (emphasis

added).
48
49

Record a t 284-85.

Deposition
Addendum "E".
50

of

Irvin

D.

Bird, Jr., Vol.

Record at 284-85; See Addendum "E".
13

I, at

64; See

BIRD'S ADMISSION OF NO AGREEMENT PRIOR TO AUGUST 22
25.

Bird said that the reason for sending the Parry letter was because "we had

no fee agreement; and we demanded, absolutely demanded a fee agreement

And

so this letter was written in an attempt to get some kind of a comprehensive agreement
together listing all of the companies that we had brought."51
26.

Prior to the Parry letter of August 20, 1986, Bird told Parry "we didn't have

an arrangement [with Watkins], the arrangement was yet to be worked out, . . ,"52
27.

Bird also said that "we had no fee agreement: and we demanded,

absolutely demanded a fee agreement or we would make sure that the offer [from
Leucadia] wasn't forthcoming,"53 and that "we've got to do something or we'll make
sure that Leucadia doesn't [make an] offer."54
28.

Bird further testified concerning the Parry letter in regard to the fee as

follows:
Q

(By Mr. Faber) Second [paragraph of Parry's letter]. That's the one that
has the formula for the fee in it?

A

My understanding is that-well, I don't know what his understanding was.
I don't think there was an understanding of anyone at this point.

51

Depositicn of Irvin D. Bird, Jr., Vol. I, at 65 (emphasis
added).

^2Id.

at 70 (emphasis added).

s3

Id.

at 65 (emphasis added).

5

*Id.

at 71 (emphasis added).
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Q

So there was no agreement at this point in writing as to any fee?

A

Not in writing, but there would have been a lot of discussions with Reed
as to what the fee ought to be or should be or could be.^5

29.

Bird further evidences the fact that there was no agreement prior to

August 22, 1986 by testifying that he told Parry in August that there was a
misunderstanding as to the fee and that "He [Parry] knew the whole thing was a
misunderstanding."56
THE AUGUST 22. 1986 AGREEMENT
30.

Bird stated that Watkins had an immediate reaction when he received

Parry's letter of August 20, 1986 and on August 22, 1986 "stormed into our [Republic's]
office."57

Bird and McSwain were present and there were "a couple [of] hours of

disagreement."58
31.

In Mid-August, Republic and Won-Door expected that Leucadia would be

making an offer to buy all the stock of Won-Door.59 Watkins wanted to get things
resolved and did not want to have a misunderstanding over the computation of the fee
if Leucadia (one of Republic's ten qualified purchasers) should make an offer.60

S5

Id.

a t 76 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) .

se

Id.

a t 77.

57

Id. a t 80.

SQ

Id.

a t 82.

59

Record a t 302.

60

D e p o s i t i c n of I r v i n D. B i r d , J r . , V o l . I , a t 8 2 .
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The

parties agreed that Republic was to be compensated on the "Lehman Formula" if any
company named on the May 21, 1986 list was the purchaser of Won-Door.61
32.

At the meeting on August 22, 1986, Bird stated that Watkins was furious

with the suggestion that Republic's attorney, Dan Berman, might sue him, and Watkins
insisted that Republic and Watkins get something in writing and basically gave Republic
an ultimatum to that effect.62Watkins wanted to get a fee agreement resolved and in
writing because Leucadia appeared close to making an offer.63
33.

Bird then said, "Good, let's get a fee [agreement] written. I've been asking

for a fee now for months and months and months, a fee agreement that covers all of our
work. My partners, Reed, want something in writing and you and I have done everything
off the cuff for seven months."64
34.

At the August 22, 1986 meeting Bird and McSwain had a long argument

with Watkins regarding the identity of the companies and a fee agreement and even
though they did not want to sign the August 22, 1986 handwritten agreement,65 Bird
testified that Watkins said, "If you don't sign this agreement you'll have no agreement
whatever."66

61

ia.

62

Id.

a t 90.

" R e c o r d a t 302.
64

Deposition of I r v i n D. Bird, J r . , Vol. I , a t 90.

65

Record a t 2 1 , 286; See Addendum "F".

66

Deposition of I r v i n D. Bird, J r . , Vol. I , a t 82.
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35.

Prior to the August 22, 1986 meeting Bird knew that Watkins was

conducting negotiations with some other possible purchaser but didn't know with
whom.67

Watkins refused to tell Republic at the meeting with whom he was

negotiating. In fact, Bird said that Watkins told them that it was none of their
business.68
36.

Also on August 22, 1986, Watkins told Bird and McSwain that the only

basis on which Republic would receive a fee would be according to the August 22, 1986
handwritten agreement, and Watkins refused to give them any other information about
any other possible buyer with whom Watkins was dealing.69
37.

Bird and McSwain on behalf of Republic then signed the August 22, 1986

agreement70 because they thought that Leucadia [one of the companies named on the
May 21, 1986 list], was going to make a cash offer to buy the Won-Door stock.71
38.

Bird's expectation that Leucadia was going to buy was a result of Bird's

conversation with Mr. Pinnock, a representative of Leucadia.72 Bird said Watkins never

61

Id.

at 70.

68

Id.

at 75, 83.

69

Id.

at 95.

70

See Addendum n F M .

71

Deposition of Irvin D. Bird, Jr., Vol. I, at 91-93; see
Deposition of Irvin D. Bird, Jr., Vol. II, at 32.
72

Deposition of Irvin D. Bird, Jr., Vol. I, at 91-93.
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told Republic what was going on with Leucadia, and "We got everything from
Leucadia."73
SALE OF WON-DOOR STOCK
39.

Won-Door's stock was sold to TS Industries, Inc. in October, 1986.74 The

sale was made on an installment basis, and was partly for cash and partly for stock.
Ultimately, TS Industries, Inc. defaulted, and the stock was bought back from the
bankruptcy court by the original stockholders of Won-Door.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.
THE MARCH 12,1986 AGREEMENT EXPIRED AND NO
OTHER CONTRACT WAS IN EFFECT BETWEEN
REPUBLIC AND WON-DOOR UNTIL THEY ENTERED
INTO THE AUGUST 22, 1986 AGREEMENT
A.

The March 12, 1986 Agreement Was Terminated

There are two written contracts alleged in the Verified Complaint in this case.
The March 12, 1986 Letter, which applied only to a sale of 22 percent of the Won-Door
stock, and the August 22, 1986 Agreement, which applied to the sale of all the stock and
which would have entitled Republic to a commission if the stock was sold to certain
identified companies. By Republic's own admission, the March 12, 1986 Agreement
became "obsolete" and expired. Won-door was then free to enter into a new agreement

73

Id.

74

a t 84.

D e p o s i t i o n of I r v i n D. B i r d , J r . , Vol. I I , a t 36.
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with Boettcher for the sale of all the stock, which it did. Pursuant to the Boettcher
Agreement ten qualified contacts of Republic were excluded.
B.

The March 12, 1986 Agreement Was Not Modified, Nor Was Any

New Agreement Entered Into Between Won-Door and Republic Until August, 1986
The undisputed evidence in this case establishes that after Republic determined
that it could not market 22 percent of the stock of Won-Door, an agreement was entered
into with Boettcher to sell all of the stock. By Bird's own admissions, an agreement was
not reached until August 22, 1986 with respect to the formula for payment of a
commission fee to Republic in the event the stock was sold to one of its ten qualified
contacts (identified by Republic to Won-Door in a letter dated May 21, 1986). There
was clearly no meeting of the minds prior to August 22, 1986, when a definitive
agreement between the parties was finally reached.
II.
REPUBLIC BID NOT ALLEGE ESTOPPEL AS A CAUSE
OF ACTION IN ITS COMPLAINT AND ITS CLAIMS OF
ESTOPPEL ARE THEREFORE NOT REVIEWABLE
The Verified Complaint in this case alleges only three causes of action: breach
of contract breach of the contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing, and fraud.
Promissory estoppel is not pleaded.

Accordingly, Republic's claim for promissory

estoppel is not reviewable on appeal.
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HI.
THE AUGUST 22,

1986 AGREEMENT

IS THE

CONTROLLING AGREEMENT BETWEEN REPUBLIC
AND WON-DOOR
A.

The August 22, 1986 Agreement Was Valid and Binding

The August 22, 1986 Agreement meets all the requirements for a valid and
binding contract under Utah law. The defenses raised by Republic to assert its invalidity
have no merit.
B.

Any Disputes, Representations or Agreements Prior to

August 22, 1986 Were Merged into the Agreement of that Date and Constituted an
Accord and Satisfaction
The August 22, 1986 handwritten agreement was clearly intended by the parties
to settle a long-standing and heated dispute over whether Republic would be entitled to
a finder's fee, and if so, what the formula for the fee would be. Thus, any prior dispute,
representation or even agreement was either incorporated in the August 22, 1986
agreement or superseded. The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between
the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary
judgment where there are no genuine issue of material fact. As to materiality, only
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law
properly preclude the entry of summaxy judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant
or unnecessary will not be counted. Accordingly, any factual disputes that may have
existed between the parties prior to August 22, 1986 are immaterial since they are
20

merged in to the August 22, 1986 Agreement and are therefore not outcome
determinative.
C.

The Ten Listed Qualified Companies" Are Clearly Identifiable

The May 21, 1986 Letter from Republic to Won-Door is the only letter that
contains the name of ten companies contacted by Republic. (The list contains eleven
names with Republic's name on the list). Watkins gave the May 21 list to Boettcher,
which accepted it and agreed that the companies on that list would be excepted from the
Boettcher contract.

The May 21 list is also the only possible letter that Republic's

attorney, Douglas J. Parry, could have been referring to in his letter of August 20, 1986.
Accordingly, Republic's argument that this term of the August 22, 1986 Agreement is
undefined or indefinite is without merit.
D.

Won-Door Did Not Breach the August 22, 1986 Agreement

There was no breach of the August 22, 1986 agreement because TS Industries,
Inc., the company to which the stock of Won-Door was ultimately sold, was not one of
the companies listed in the May 21, 1986 letter. The last sentence of the August 22,
1986 agreement states that "Other than above [the list of qualified contacts], Republic
Group entitled to no fee."

This Agreement does away with all of Republic's claims

since the company to which the Won-Door was ultimately sold was not on the list.
The August 22, 1986 Agreement does allow a $5,000 fee to Republic if the WonDoor was sold to a non-qualified contact of Republic. The stock was, in fact sold to a
non-qualified contact and Republic was tendered the $5,000, but refused to accept it.

21

Won-Door has therefore fully performed its duties under the Agreement and is not in
breach.
IV.
PRIOR TO THE SIGNING OF THE AUGUST 22, 1986
AGREEMENT, WON-DOOR HAD NO CONTRACT WITH
REPUBLIC AND THEREFORE NO DUTY OF GOOD
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING EXISTED BETWEEN THE
PARTIES; AFTER THE FORMATION OF THE AUGUST
22, 1986 AGREEMENT, THERE WAS NO BREACH OF
ANY DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
A.

The Covenant of Good Faith Arises Only After the Contract

is Formed Because the Covenant is Defined by the Contract at Issue
A party's duty of good faith and fair dealing is defined by the terms and
conditions of the contract. Therefore, the duty does not arise until the contract is
formed. Each of the matteis asserted by Republic as a breach of this duty were matters
that allegedly occurred prior to the formation of the Agreement on August 22, 1986.
B.

Won-Door Did Not Breach Any Duty of Good Faith and Fair

Dealing Under the August 22, 1986 Agreement
Each of the matters asserted by Republic as a breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing were matters that allegedly occurred prior to the formation of the
Agreement on August 22, 1986, Therefore, Republic has no cause of action for breach
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
22

V.
THE

TRIAL

COURT

CORRECTLY

GRANTED

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON REPUBLICS CLAIM FOR FRAUD
A.

Watkins Had No Duty to Speak

In order to establish a claim for fraud where the assertion is that the defendant
failed to disclose a material matter, the defendant must have a duty to speak. The only
basis alleged by Republic for which Watkins would have had a duty to speak is the
alleged existence of a confidential relationship. As a matter of law there was no
confidential relationship between Bird and Watkins, nor between Republic and
Defendants.
B.

Any Allegedly Omitted Fact Would Have Made No Difference

Republic incorrectly claims that Watkins committed fraud by failing to disclose
who it was dealing with. This argument is misplaced because Republic had already
picked its list of ten qualified contacts on May 21, 1986. Doug Parry's letter of August
20, 1986, which attempted to resolve the fee issue on behalf of Republic, referred to this
same list. This list could not be changed at will. To do so would have subjected
Defendants to liability for breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing under its
contract with Boettcher, who earned and was paid a commission on the sale to TS
Industries, Inc. As a result, the claimed omission is totally immaterial.
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C.

Watkins Made No Misrepresentation

The only person whom Republic claims made misrepresentations is Watkins. The
case against Watkins is barred by the bankruptcy proceedings which are the subject of
a Motion to Dismiss presently before this court. Furthermore, Defendants strongly
believe that Watkins did nothing wrong and that he did not make any misrepresentation.
Republic has alleged that defendants committed fraud by repeatedly assuring Republic
that it did not need a contract and by not informing Republic of negotiations with TS
Industries, Inc. Republic claims that Watkins, when asked about who he was dealing
with other than Leucadia said it was not a company on Republic's list. There was
no false statement of a presently existing material fact because TS Industries, Inc., one
of the companies Won-Door was dealing with, was not on the list of qualified contacts.
Indeed, it was not on any list provided by Republic. To disclose any information to
Republic may have exposed Won-Door to a claim by Boettcher for breach of duty.
Also, there was no justifiable reliance by Republic. Bird's continual efforts to get
a contract demonstrate that he knew one was necessary. Bird testified repeatedly about
the continuous and heated dispute with Watkins during the whole period of time and
about Republic's refusal to accept anything but a written contract. The list of qualified
contacts was already established back on May 21, 1986. Bird and McSwain on behalf
of Republic then signed the agreement.. Thus, there clearly could not be any reliance.
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VI.
REPUBLIC'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IS MOOTED BY THE COURTS GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS
The denial of a motion for partial summary judgment is a non-appealable order.
The relief sought by Republic's motion for partial summary judgment is the mirror image
of the relief granted to defendants. Because the trial court properly granted Defendants'
motion for summary judgment, as shown by this Brief, Republic's appeal on this issue
is not well taken, and the trial court's order should be affirmed.
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ARGUMENT
I.
THE MARCH 12, 1986 AGREEMENT EXPIRED AND NO
OTHER CONTRACT WAS IN EFFECT BETWEEN
REPUBLIC AND WON-DOOR UNTIL THEY ENTERED
INTO THE AUGUST 22, 1986 AGREEMENT
A. The March 12, 1986 Agreement Was Terminated.
The Verified Complaint in this case asserts that there were two written contracts.
The first was Watkins' letter of March 12, 198675 which applied only to a sale of 22
percent of the Won-Door stock at a price of $42.00 per share.76

The second contract

was the one-page handwritten agreement of August 22, 1986 which applied to a sale of
all the Won-Door stock and would entitle Republic to a commission if the stock was sold
to certain identified companies.77

The Verified Complaint contains admissions by

Republic that the August 22, 1986 Agreement was an agreement between the parties.78
By Republic's own admission, the earlier letter agreement between Republic and
Won-Door of March 12, 1986 became "obsolete" when Republic concluded it was

75

R e c o r d a t 280; Addendum " B " .

76

Addendum " B " ,

77

Addendum " F " .

78

R e c o r d a t 7, p a r a g r a p h 2 4 .
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impractical or impossible to sell a 22 percent interest in a closely held company.9 Mr.
Bird testified in his deposition with respect to the March 12, 1986 Agreement as follows:
In fact, this document became very obsolete. This was a document
where we defined a 22 percent investor in Won-Door for which we were
to be paid $250,000. This document became obsolete when it was
determined that Won-Door would entertain a sale for the entire
on

corporation . . ..
Won-Door and its shareholders decided in April of 1986 to sell all of the stock
of Won-Door. Because the prior contract was terminated, defendants were free at that
time to enter into a new agreement with another company for the sale of all the stock
of Won-Door. The individual defendants decided to sell all of the their Won-Door stock
and employed a larger, more experienced company (Boettcher) for that purpose.81
Republic was aware of this and attempted to get Republic to use Drexel, Burnham &
Lambert to handle the sale of all the stock of Won-Door.82
B. The March 12, 1986 Agreement Was Not Modified, Nor Was
Any New Agreement Entered Into Between Won-Door and Republic Until August, 1986.
Republic's First Cause of Action in its Verified Complaint attempts to allege a
vague, composite, ongoing contract between the date the March 12, 1986 became
obsolete and October 27, 1986, when all of the Won-Door Stock was sold.83 This could
79
80

8i

Deposition of Irvin D. Bird, Jr., Vol. I, at 15, 19.

Record at 19.

Record a t 287-92; See Addendum "G".

82

Record a t 299, 481.

S3

See Record a t 9-10.
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have occurred, however, only if the March 12, 1986 Agreement was modified or an
entirely new contract was entered into between the parties. A contract may only be
modified by the parties observing the same requisites necessary to form a new contract.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that to establish a contract (and as a condition
precedent to its enforcement) there must be a meeting of the minds which must be
shown with sufficient definiteness to establish all the essential terms of the contract.
Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc.. 558 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976).84 As the
undisputed facts, from the mouth of Republic's own key witness, demonstrate, there was
no meeting of the minds between Republic and Won-Door from the time the March 12,
1986 Agreement expired in April until August 22, 1986.
There is no doubt that the August 22, 1986 handwritten agreement was not a
confirmation of an earlier meeting of the minds regarding any definite contract terms,
but was at most the resolution of a stormy relationship which up to that time had been
a long standing, continuous and acrimonious dispute. Bird testified in his first deposition
that the relationship between Republic and Watkins on numerous occasions prior to
August

22, 1986 involved

"great

~4See also B & R Supply

Co. v. Bringhurst,

P.2d 1216 (Utah 1972); Bunnell
597

(Utah

Corporation,

1962);

John

Call

disagreements"85,

v. Bills,
Engineering,

disagreements"86,

"extreme

28 Utah 2d 442, 503

13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d
Inc.

v.

Manti

743 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1987).

85

Deposition of Irvin D. Bird, Jr., Vol. I, at 27.

se

Id.

at 28.

28

City

"continuing argument"87, "dispute"88, "heated discussions"89, "words with Reed"90, and
"misunder-standings"91, and the payment of and amount of any such fee. Furthermore,
Bird said that he and his partners were "furious"92 and "unhappy"93 with Watkins
because Watkins refused to tell them with whom he was negotiating at any time and also
refused to sign an agreement with Republic until August 22, 1986.
Bird also testified that in May, 1986 Republic did not want to be limited to only
ten companies, that "those issues were never resolved, never resolved"94 prior to August
22, 1986. Nor was there any definitive agreement on essential terms. Bird further
testified: "There was never an agreement definitely as to what the fee agreement was."95
He also testified that in August, 1986 prior to Parry's letter of August 20, 1986 to
Watkins that Bird told Parry "we had no fee agreement; and we demanded, absolutely
demanded a fee agreement" from Watkins.96 Bird said that as a consequence of Parry's
August 20, 1986 letter, Watkins "stormed" into Republic's office and after two hours of
87 Id.

at 27, 52, 83.

88

Id.

at 47.

89

Id.

at 50.

90

Id.

at 50,

91

Id.

at 77.

92 Id.

at 55,

93

Id.

at 92

94

Id.

at 27.

95

Id.

at 36.

9e

Id.

at 55.
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disagreement and argument, Republic and Watkins signed the August 22, 1986
handwritten agreement97 to which was attached Republic's letter of May 21, 1986,
which lists Leucadia and the ten other companies, on which Republic would receive a
fee if any of those companies purchased the stock of Won-Door.98
Courts will not remake a contract for the parties. In Pingree the parties disputed
the amount of rent which should be charged when a lease was renewed. The agreement
contained express terms for determining the amount, but the application of the factors
listed in the agreement was ambiguous and each party argued for a different result. The
reviewing court reversed the trial court which had determined the parties intended a
reasonable rent, because the trial court's interpretation, "had the effect of nullifying the
express factors specified by the parties, and substituting a new agreement to which the
parties had not committed themselves."99

The Utah Supreme Court therefore

determined the option to renew was too vague and indefinite to be enforceable.
From Bird's own testimony there was clearly no meeting of the minds prior to
August 22, 1986, nor any definite agreement on any subject. Therefore, once the March
12, 1986 Agreement became obsolete and terminated, there was no other contract
between the parties until the handwritten agreement of August 22, 1986. Republic's
letter of May 21, 1986 was then made a part of the August 22, 1986 handwritten

97

a t 80-82.

98

Record at 18.

Id.

" 5 5 8 P.2d a t 1321.
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agreement which clearly settled any dispute as to the identity of the as to which Republic
would be entitled to a fee and the formula for the fee.
II.
REPUBLIC DID NOT ALLEGE ESTOPPEL AS A CAUSE
OF ACTION IN ITS COMPLAINT AND ITS CLAIMS OF
ESTOPPEL ARE THEREFORE NOT REVIEWABLE
Republic has claimed in its brief that defendants should be estopped from denying
"the validity of the March 12, 1986 Agreement" and from denying "that a fee based upon
a reasonable application of the March 12, 1986 Agreement is due Republic."100
However, a cause of action for promissory estoppel was not asserted in the Verified
Complaint; instead, Republic asserted only three causes of action: breach of contract,
breach of the contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing, and fraud.101
In Shire Development v. Frontier Investments,102 this court considered an
appeal from a summary judgment granted by Judge Daniels in which a similar new issue
was not raised by the pleadings below. There, the plaintiffs (joint venturers of the
purchaser) challenged the validity of a liquidated damages provision in a real estate
contract.

The court held that the joint venture agreement did not constitute an

assignment of the purchaser's interest in the real estate contract and that, although
plaintiffs had paid over $80,000 of the purchase price, they did not have standing to
^ A p p e l l a n t ' s Brief, a t 35.
101

Record a t 9-13.

102

799 P.2d 221 (Utah App. 1990).
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bring an action on the contract. Plaintiffs argued for the first time on appeal an
alternate theory that if they did not have privity of contract, they still had standing to
bring an equitable cause of action to recover money they paid under the real estate
contract. The court stated:
Appellants raise several equitable arguments, including "equitable
relief from the unconscionable penalty," "equitable action to recover
money," and partial performance. None of these arguments were made to
the trial court except "equitable action to recover money," and it was
raised only briefly in the oral argument by appellants on Frontier's motion
for summary judgment and thus was not sufficiently preserved for appeal.
As we have reiterated many times, we will not consider an issue raised on
appeal for the first time,,103
Similarly, in Thayer v. Gushing,104 the Utah Supreme Court applied the same
rule and stated:
Defendant raises this point for the first time on appeal. He did not
present to the trial court the question of whether the oral agreement was
a separate contract or a modification of the written agreement. In fact,
the case was tried by both parties upon the assumption that the oral
agreement was a modification of the written agreement and was therefore
a part of it. Issues not presented to the trial court for decision are not
reviewable by this Court, and we express no opinion on the issue.10°
In the instant case, since promissory estoppel was not pleaded below as a cause
of action, this issue is not reviewable on appeal.

103

799 P.2d at 224 (emphasis added), citing Heiner
v.
S.J.
Groves & Sons Co., 7790 P. 2d 107, 115 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Mascaro
v. Davis,
741 P.2d 938, 944 (Utah 1987).
104
100

688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984),

Id.

at 857 (emphasis added; citation omitted).

Bundy v. Century

Equipment

Company, Inc.,

See also

692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah

1984)("matters neither raised in the pleadings nor put in issue at
the trial cannot be considered for the first time on appeal").
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III.
THE AUGUST 22,

1986 AGREEMENT IS THE

CONTROLLING AGREEMENT BETWEEN REPUBLIC
AND WON-DOOR
A The August 22, 1986 Agreement Was Valid and Binding.
Won-Door and Republic had numerous disputes after the March 12, 1986
Agreement became obsolete. On August 20, 1986 Doug Parry sent a letter attempting
to set forth the agreement of the parties. However, Watkins had an "immediate
reaction" to Parry's letter and went over to Republic's offices to resolve the matter.
According to Bird's own testimony he stated his intent at the meeting as follows: "Good,
let's get a fee [agreement] written. I've been asking for a fee now for months and
months and months, a fee agreement that covers all of our work. My partners, Reed,
want something in writing and you and I have done everything off the cuff for seven
months."101 After a couple of hours of discussion, Bird, McSwain and Watkins came
to an agreement for Republic and Won-Door, respectively, which they embodied in the
August 22, 1986 Agreement. It clearly reflects their intent to set forth a fee agreement
and ends by stating: "Other than above, Republic Group entitled to no fee/102

101

Deposition of I r v i n D. Bird, J r . , Vol. I , a t 9(K

102

See Addendum F.
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Republic has asserted defenses to the validity of the August 22, 1986 Agreement, which
are addressed elsewhere in this Brief.103
B. Any Disputes, Representations or Agreements Prior to August
22,1986 Were Merged into the Agreement of that Date and Constituted an Accord and
Satisfaction.
Republic has alleged that there were numerous disputes, representations and even
promises during the period from March, 1986 to August, 1986. In circumstances where
parties enter into a written agreement after negotiations and disputes, the written
agreement is the settlement of their respective claims. In Weight v. Miller,104 the
plaintiff sued to enforce a promissory note which was signed by the defendant to settle
a prior dispute. The note stated that it was to be paid in money. The defendant alleged
that the note had been executed as only part of the transaction and that the note was
to be paid in stock rather than money. The trial court rejected defendant's argument
and entered a money judgment in plaintiffs favor. Defendant appealed, and in affirming
the money judgment the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows:
. . . wherever there are negotiations between parties and they thereafter
execute a writing in regard to it, it is generally to be presumed that it
represents that settlement of their respective claims. This is especially

103

Republic' s claim as to voidness of the August 22, 1986
Agreement based upon the alleged breach of duty of good faith and
fair dealing and based upon misrepresentation are dealt with in
Sections IV and V of this Brief. Republic's claims as to voidness
for failure of the parties to have a meeting of the minds as to the
identity of the ten qualified companies is treated in Section III-C
of this Brief.
104

16 Utah 2d 112, 396 P.2d 626 (Utah 1964).
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true when there has been disagreement and disputation between
them.105
In Mawhinney v. Jensen,106 the Utah Supreme Court also explained that the
terms of a final contract govern preliminary contracts if there are ambiguities and all
prior terms are merged into the final contract, unless it can be clearly shown that the
final terms, because of inadvertence, ambiguity or fraud, do not represent the intention
of the parties.107
The August 22, 1986 handwritten agreement was clearly intended by the parties
to settle a long-standing and heated dispute over whether Republic would be entitled to
a finder's fee if all the stock was sold, and if so, what the formula for the fee would be,
and the identity of the potential purchasers regarding whom Republic would be paid a
fee. Thus, any prior dispute, representation or even agreement was either incorporated
in the August 22, 1986 agreement or superseded. Specifically, any differences regarding
the payment of a finders fee, including the formula to arrive at such fee, and the identity
of the qualified contacts identified by Republic pursuant to the Boettcher contract were
resolved by and merged into the August 22, 1986 Agreement.
All of the matters raised by Republic's complaint were resolved in the August 22,
1986 Agreement.

105

As cited in the Statement of Facts herein, there was constant

396 P.2d at 627 (emphasis added).

106

120 Utah 142, 232 P.2d 769 (Utah 1951)-

107

See also State

Bank of Sevier

v. American Cement and

Co.,
80 Utah 250, 10 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1932); Halloran-Judge
Co. v. Heath,
70 Utah 124, 258 P. 342 (Utah 1927).

35

Plaster
Trust

disagreement and dispute as to Republic's entitlement to a fee and the formula for such
fee.

All of these disputes were resolved by the parties in the August 22, 1986

Agreement. This constitutes an accord and satisfaction, which merges all previous
disputes into the August 22, 1986 Agreement.108

Accordingly, all claims of Republic

must stand or fall under the August 22, 1986 Agreement.
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.109 the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed in depth
the purpose of summary judgment and the appropriate application of the Rule 56
standard that a moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the matters before the
court show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The Court stated:
By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of
some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.
As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are
material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be
counted.110

1Ub

See Weight

1964); State

v.

Miller,

Bank of Sevier

16 Utah 2d 112, 396 P.2d 626 (Utah

v. American

Cement and Plaster

Utah 250, 10 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1932); Halloran-Judge
Heath,
70 Utah 124, 258 P. 342 (Utah 1927).
109

Trust

Co.,

80

Co.

v.

477 U.S. 242, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (U.S. 1986).

110

Id. at 247-48 (emphasis in the original in the first quoted
paragraph; emphasis added in the second quoted paragraph).
See
also Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 91 L. Ed. 265, 106 S.
Ct. 2548 (U.S. 1986).
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According to this standard, any factual issues which might have existed prior to
the parties entering into the August 22, 1986 Agreement are immaterial since they are
merged into the agreement and are therefore not outcome determinative. Judge Daniels
acknowledged this in granting summary judgment in this case when he said:
THE COURT: Well, I don't think it [plaintiffs showing on
summary judgment] is very thick. I think that it is possible to read the
affidavits in such a wav as to create an issue of some kind, but it is a small
one. It is a thin one.
I think the logical way to look at the August handwritten fee
agreement is that is setting the amount of the agreement. It is clear it is
setting it only as to those ten contacts. And based on the other evidence,
I think it is pretty clear that those ten contacts, when the list was supplied
in April, were intended to be the ones that would entitle Republic for a
fee.
If there is a case here, it is not enough, I think, to get by a motion
under the newer standard for summary judgment, and I think under the
circumstances I am going to grant the Motion for Summary Judgment of
the defendants . . .. m
C. The "Ten Listed Qualified Companies" Are Clearly Identifiable.
The May 21, 1986 Letter from Republic to Won-Door is the only letter that
contains the name of ten companies contacted by Republic. (The list contains eleven
names with Republic's name on the list). Watkins gave the May 21 list to Boettcher,
which accepted it and agreed that the companies on that list would be excepted from the
Boettcher contract, even though there were 11 names including Republic.112 The May
21 list is also the only possible letter that Republic's attorney, Douglas J. Parry, could

Record at 415.
Record at 300.
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have been referring to in his letter of August 20, 1986, when he referred to "Leucadia
and the other qualified ten listed companies. . ..Ml13

Accordingly, Republic's

argument that this term of the August 22, 1986 Agreement is undefined or indefinite is
without merit.
D. Won-Door Did Not Breach the August 22, 1986 Agreement,
There has been no breach of the August 22, 1986 agreement because TS
Industries, Inc., the company to which the stock of Won-Door was ultimately sold, was
not one of the companies listed in the May 21, 1986 letter.114 The last sentence of the
August 22, 1986 agreement states that "Other than above [the list of qualified contacts],
Republic Group entitled to no fee." This Agreement does away with all of Republic's
claims since the company to which the Won-Door was ultimately sold was not on the
list.115 This is tacitly admitted by Republic's desperate attempt to distance itself from
the August 22, 1986 Agreement and its effort to resurrect and drastically modify (after
the fact) the March 12, 1986 Agreement.

113

Record at 284. Again, excluding the name of Republic, there
are 10 names on the May 21, 1986 list. See Record at 18, 281.
114

It is further significant that TS Industries, Inc. was never
listed by Republic on any list, nor was it contacted by Republic.
Republic did list a contact with Thermal Systems, Inc., but not on
the list of 10 qualified contacts in its May 21, 1986 letter
pursuant to the Boettcher contract. Thermal Systems, Inc. was a
subsidiary of TS Industries, Inc. (Record at 300), whom Republic
strongly discouraged Won-Door from pursuing. Deposition of Irvin
D. Bird, Jr., Vol. I, at 60.
115

Record at 21.

38

The August 22, 1986 Agreement does allow a $5,000 fee to Republic if the WonDoor was sold to a non-qualified contact of Republic. The stock was, in fact sold to a
non-qualified contact and Republic was tendered the $5,000, but refused to accept it.
Won-Door has therefore fully performed its duties under the Agreement and is not in
breach.
IV.
PRIOR TO THE SIGNING OF THE AUGUST 22, 1986
AGREEMENT, WON-DOOR HAD NO CONTRACT WITH
REPUBLIC AND THEREFORE NO DUTY OF GOOD
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING EXISTED BETWEEN THE
PARTIES; AFTER THE FORMATION OF THE AUGUST
22, 1986 AGREEMENT, THERE WAS NO BREACH OF
ANY DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
Plaintiff-appellant's second cause of action claims that defendants allegedly
breached the implied covenant to deal in good faith under the handwritten agreement
of August 22, 1986 by not including TS Industries (the ultimate purchaser of the WonDoor stock) as one of the possible purchasing companies for which Republic would be
entitled to a fee.
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A. The Covenant of Good Faith Arises Only After the Contract is
Formed Because the Covenant is Defined by the Contract at Issue.
In St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital116 the Utah
Supreme Court stated
In this state, a covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in
most, if not all, contractual relationships. . . . For commercial contracts,
a covenant of good faith and fair dealing is statutorily imposed. Utah
Code Ann. § 70A-1-203. Under the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, each party impliedly promises that he will not intentionally or
purposely do anything which will destroy or injure the other party's right
to receive the fruits of the contract. A violation of the covenant gives rise
to a claim for breach of contract.
An examination of express contract terms alone is insufficient to
determine whether there has been a breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. To comply with his obligation to perform a
contract in good faith, a party's actions must be consistent with the agreed
common purpose and the justified expectations of the other party. The
purpose, intentions, and expectations of the parties should be determined
by considering the contract language and the course of dealings between
and conduct of the parties.117
Clearly, any duty of good faith is defined by the "agreed common purpose" of the
executed contract. No such "agreed common purpose" was present in this case until the
August 22, 1986 contract was signed. No valid contract existed prior to that time.
Absent a valid contract, no covenant of good faith existed under St. Benedict's
Development and therefore, there was no duty of good faith and fair dealing prior to
contract formation.

b

811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991)

'Id. at 199-200 (emphasis added)(citations omitted).
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B. Won-Door Did Not Breach Any Duty of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing Under the August 22, 1986 Agreement.
Republic's claim for a fee is further precluded by its conduct and the terms of the
August 22, 1986 Agreement which it agreed to. At the meeting on August 22, 1986, Bird
and McSwain asked Watkins what other companies Watkins was dealing with. Watkins
told Bird and McSwain that it was none of their business. This was because the list of
qualified buyers had already been established by Republic on May 21, 1986. Bird and
McSwain thereafter executed the August 22,1986 agreement on behalf of Republic. The
agreement names eleven potential purchasing companies (including Republic) for which
Republic might have received a fee, if the designated companies bought all of WonDoor's stock.
After naming the eleven potential buyer companies, the August 22, 1986
agreement provides, "Other than above, Republic Group entitled to no fee." Neither
Thermal Systems, Inc. nor TS Industries is mentioned in the August 22,1986 agreement;
nor by reference m the May 21, 1986 letter. Each of the matters asserted by Republic
as a breach of this duty were matters that allegedly occurred prior to the formation of
the Agreement on August 22, 1986. Therefore, Republic has no cause of action for
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
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V.
THE

TRIAL

COURT

CORRECTLY

GRANTED

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON REPUBLICS CLAIM FOR FRAUD
A. Watkins Had No Duty to Speak.
Republic has asserted the presence of a confidential trust relationship with
defendants which allegedly imposed upon defendants a duty to speak. Republic has also
contended throughout its argument that Watkins was the agent of Won-Door. Under
these circumstances it is hard to understand how plaintiff can argue that Watkins, as
attorney and agent for Won-Door, had a special confidential relationship with plaintiff.
It is well established from the law that an agent's sole loyalty must be to his principal.
"An agent is subject to a duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the principal
in all matters connected with his agency."118
Plaintiff has cited no case or other authority for the proposition that a party
dealing with an attorney and agent for an opposing party can rely on or expect to be in
a confidential relationship with or to be owed a duty of loyalty by the attorney/agent for
the opposing party. The alleged friendship between Bird and Watkins does not destroy
the agency relationship between Watkins and Won-Door, nor does it entitle plaintiff to
any special duties or tieatment.

Restatement (Second) Agency, § 387.
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Utah has found the presence of a confidential relationship when "one party,
having gained the trust and confidence of another, exercises extraordinary influence over
the other party."119 In Von Hake v. Thomas, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
It is a question of fact and "rests upon the principle of inequality between
the parties and implies a position of superiority occupied by one of the
parties over the other. Mere confidence in one person by another is not
sufficient alone to constitute such a relationship. The confidence must be
reposed by one under such circumstances as to create a corresponding
duty, either legal or moral, upon the part of the other to observe the
confidence, and it must result in a situation where as a matter of fact there
is superior influence on one side and dependence on the other.120
In the present case, both Republic and defendants were experienced businessmen
acting in a commercial transaction. Watkins and Won-Door had no duty to Republic
to disclose any of the confidential information regarding its contract with Boettcher
because no special relationship existed between them. To have done so would have
exposed Won-Door to liability for breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing under
its contract with Boettcher. Therefore, Watkins' absolute refusal to tell Bird and
McSwain on August 22, 1986 the names of any companies he was dealing with, and the
execution of the agreement by Bird and McSwain eliminates any possible reliance by
Republic under its fraud claim.
In the case of Hurley v. Kallof,121 the Arizona Court of Appeals decided a case
involving a commission sought for the same piece of real estate when the buyer had

^Von Hake v.

°Id.
1

Thomas,

705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985).

at 769.

409 P.2d 730 (Ariz.App.1966)
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employed two different brokers. The court stated, "To require the seller to inform other
brokers of each and every turn in the negotiations would not be in accord with everyday
business procedures."122 The court held that because the second broker was the only
broker carrying on active negotiations with the eventual buyer, and because the first
buyer had allowed negotiations between it and the eventual buyer to fall through, the
first broker was not entitled to a commission.123 "A broker must be diligent and
remain informed of the status of his listing through his own efforts. When he neglects
to do this he may not then complain when another broker in a competitive market closes
the sale."124
Based upon Hurley, Won-Door had no duty to keep Republic informed of the
progress of the Boettcher sale of the Won-Door stock. Accordingly, when the Boettcher
contract is considered, Watkins was not only justified in not disclosing any details
regarding Won-Door's contract with Boettcher, he had a duty not to speak.
B. Any Allegedly Omitted Fact Would Have Made No Difference.
Republic incorrectly claims that Watkins committed fraud by failing to disclose
who it was dealing with. This argument is misplaced because Republic had already
picked its list of ten qualified contacts on May 21, 1986. Doug Parry's letter of August
20, 1986, which attempted to resolve the fee issue on behalf of Republic, referred to this
same list. This list could not be changed at will. To do so would have subjected
i22

id.

i23

id.

i24

id.
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Defendants to liability for breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing under its
contract with Boettcher, who earned and was paid a commission on the sale to TS
Industries, Inc. Watkins was therefore, absolutely correct when he refused to disclose
the names of any companies with whom he was dealing. As a result, the claimed
omission is totally immaterial.
C. Watkins Made No Misrepresentation.
There is no evidence in the record that any of the Defendants made any
misrepresentation.

Indeed, the only person whom Republic claims made

misrepresentations is Watkins. The case against Watkins is barred by the bankruptcy
proceedings which are the subject of a Motion to Dismiss presently before this court.
Furthermore, Defendants strongly believe that Watkins did nothing wrong and that he
did not make any misrepresentation. Republic has alleged that defendants committed
fraud by repeatedly assuring Republic that it did not need a contract and by not
informing Republic of negotiations with TS Industries, Inc. Republic claims that
Watkins, when asked about who he was dealing with other than Leucadia said it was not
a company on Republic's list.
In Utah to sustain a claim of fraud based upon an affirmative statement, the
following elements must be established:125
1.

a representation;

2.

concerning a presently existing material fact;

125

Pace v. Parrish,
122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952);
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980).
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3.

which was false;

4.

which the representor either
a.

knew to be false, or

b.

made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon
which to base such representation;

5.

for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it;

6.

that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity;

7.

did in fact rely upon it;

8.

was thereby induced to act;

9.

to his injury and damage.

If any element is missing, the claim must fail. In this case, there was
no false statement of a presently existing material fact because TS Industries, Inc., one
of the companies Won-Door was dealing with, was not on the list of qualified contacts.
Indeed, it was not on any list provided by Republic. Also, it appears that another
principal deficiency in Republic's claim is that there was no justifiable reliance by
Republic. Bird's continual efforts to get a contract demonstrate that he knew one was
necessary. Bird testified repeatedly about the continuous and heated dispute with
Watkins during the whole period of time and about Republic's refusal to accept anything
but a written contract.
At the meeting of August 22, 1986 when the handwritten agreement was signed,
Watkins specifically refused to tell Bird and McSwain with whom he was dealing and
said that it was none of their business. This was justified because there was no
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agreement at that time between Republic and Won-Door, because the list of qualified
contacts was already established back on May 21, 1986, and because to disclose any
information may have breached Won-Door's duty to Boettcher. Bird and McSwain on
behalf of Republic then signed the agreement. Thus, there clearly could not be any
reliance. In regard to almost all of the required elements, Republic's claim of fraud is
amply refuted by Bird's own testimony.
VI.
REPUBLICS MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IS MOOTED BY THE COURTS GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS
The relief sought by Republic's motion for partial summary judgment is the mirror
image of the relief granted to defendants. Because the trial court properly granted
Defendants' motion for summary judgment, as shown by this Brief, Republic's appeal on
this issue is not well taken, and the trial court's order should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The undisputed facts, taken in the light most favorable to Republic, demonstrate
that Judge Daniels properly granted summary judgment in Defendants' favor and denied
Republic's motion for partial summary judgment. The undisputed facts are based largely
upon the sworn testimony of Republic's own key witness, Irvin D. Bird, Jr.
Defendants respectfully request this Court to affirm the trial court's judgment
granting Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Republic's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.
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JAY A. SMART

WON-DOOR Corporation

Prc*tdent/Bo*xxi Oxairsiaja

SSSSpSra^
-<? * ' ^ > i r ^ ^ <7#

1865 South 3480 West/Salt Lake City, Utah 84104/(801} 973-7500

February 20, 1986

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
The Directors and Shareholders of WON-DOOR
CORPORATION, a Utah Corporation, have adopted a plan
to raise funding through either an initial public
offering or a private placement, of common stock.
Mr. Reed A. Watkins, Attorney-at-Law, is the
exclusive agent and representative of the Corporation
and its shareholders for this purpose. Mr- Watlcins
'is fully authorized and empowered to negotiate and
conclude the funding transaction on behalf of*the
Corporation and its shareholders.

<i

MLLL.

Jay A. Smart-'

EXHIBIT"

A

LAW OFFICES OF

WATKINS
^ L f - ^ f ^ - 1 ^ Trfv
ftWETH DOUCLO W/JXJNi
&wu>LHoocaos
B«AN V. BUXNITT

S

FA/BER

2102 EAST 3300 SOUTH
SAO* LAKE CITY. UTAH 8 4 1 0 9
p^j
8 0 J 486-563^

March 12, 1986

Mr. I r v i n D. Bird, J r .
The Republic Group
185 South Main S t r e e t
S u i t e 1050
S a l t Lake Ctiy, Utah 84111
Re: Itfbn-Dcor Corporation
Dear I r v :
This letter will confirm our understanding of a fee arrangement
should The Republic Group through its contacts fund a private placement of Vfon-Door Cbrporation stock.
The airount of the finding is $7,392,000 for 176,000 shares of the
Won-Dcor stock. This is corputed at $42.00 per share. Members of the
Smart family are the sellers.
Wen-Door will have 800,000 shares outstanding (all camun and
of one class) after completion of the funding. The 176,000 shares
represents twenty-two (22%) percent thereof. VJbn-Door is adjusting
its executive bonus plan which will result in increased corporate
earnings over the amount set forth in the Selected Pro Fbnra Financial
Information. Won-Door anticipates is June 30, 1986 after-tax earnings
to be not less than $2,688,000.
It is Von-Dcor's intent to becrme a public crnpany within a five
year period.
Upon caipletion and execution of such funding arrangerrent with The
Republic Group's contact(s), a cormission of $250,000 will be paid to
The Republic Group. The Republic Group will bear its cwn costs. Tto
avoid misunderstanding regarding contacts, names should be submitted
and their status qualified in advance.
Truly Yours,

Reed"
TW/bt

EXHIBIT " J L

tEUpe ffizpublic d r m t p
May 21, .1986

Reed A. Watkins
Watkins & Faher
2102 E. 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Dear Reed,
This letter serves as formal notice to you of our list of prospective
buyers for the Won Dcor Corporation.
1. Wes Pay Corp,
2. Capital Consultants Inc.
3. The Republic Group
4. The Dallas Corp.
5. Leucadia Inc.
6. Weyerhaeuser Corp.
7. Masco
8. Peachtree Dcor, A Division of Indal Corp,
9. Armstrong World Corp.
10. Teledyne Corp.
11. Dcminick & Daninick
We appreciate your desixe to vaork with us and hope that you know that v^
are working diligently to effect the sale of your clientfs caipany.
Personal Regards,

Frederick W. Volcansek
Vice President
The Recublic Grouo

cc: Bryant D. Cragun
Irvin D. Bird Jr.
Mark E. McSwain
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August 2 0 , 198 6

Reed r. ~
Watkin< i — •*2102 East 3300 Sout
Salt Lake City, U T
RE:

The Republic Group/Won-Door

Dear Mr, Watkins:
I am writing in confirmation of our telephone
conversation of last week and your assurance that you
recognized your obligation to The Republic Group if Leucadia or
any of the other qualified ten listed companies acquires an
interest in Won-Door,

I h a v e r e. v i e w e d the d o c u m e n t s a n d t h i s m a 11 e r w i t h 11: !/
Bird and after confirmation with you, my undertanding is that:
If one of the qualified companies, including Leucadia,
purchases an interest in Won-Door, The Republic Group
is entitled to a commission. The commission is based
on a fee of $250,000 per 22% of Won-Door purchased,
thus if 100% of Won-Door is purchased by one of the
qualified corporations then The Republ I c Group should
be entitled to a $1,000,000 fee.
If that does not comport with your understanding I would
appreciate hearing immediately so that I can discuss this
matter with my client.
My understanding is that Leucadia has been negotiating
very seriously with Won-Door and. that last week after examining
the books they made an offer. If this offer is accepted The
Republic Group would be entitled to its fees.

EXHIBIT

fc^

Reed A
Page 2
August:

5

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter . j w i n
assure my client that there is no misunderstanding o i tl iagreement.
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Boettcher& Company
M l M i k a i W

828 Seventeentfc Mr«<*
P.O. Box 54
Denver, Colorado 80201-0OS4
(303) 828-8000

A p r i l
*

28 ,

1986

11 Jay Jmar,
Chairmai
Won-Door Corporation
1865 South 3480 West
Salt

Lake C i t y ,

Df=ar

Ii

tliai

84104

:

The purpose ot this letter is to contiim i writing the
understanding between Boettcher & Company, Inc. ("Boettcher") and
Won-Door, Corporation (nthe Company") whereby Boettcher will act
as exclusive representative for the Company to arrange and to
negotiate, on such terms as may be acceptable ti the Board of
Directors of the Company, and subject to the approval of the
Stockholders of the Company, if necessary or appropriate, a
possible transaction with an appropriate third party concerning
either:
the salt
of a 11 or a portion of the outstanding stock ni
assets of the Company# i

(i
( i|

the acquisiti mt

Our arrangeiiiHi
as follows:
1)

consolidation r? merger
|||1(i

f

t the company

L
j J.ierewjLtJ1

s

J l a J ^ J De

Boettcher shall commence itJ activity tollowing
acceptance and approval of this agreement by fhe

Company*
2)

Boettcher .shall work with the Company in the preparation
of a memorandum (the "Offering Memoranaum ) . This
Offering Memorandum will describe and analyze the
Company, its operations, management, current financial
datl and other appropriate information. The °«ering
Memorandum will be used m discussions wit £ Prospective
purchasers and its form and content shall be f u ° ^ t fco
approval by the Company. Subject to the terms hereof,
S S Company and Boettcher shall have ^ u n r e s t r i c t e d
riaht to use the Offering Memorandum during the term ot
this agreement
The Company understands and confirm.

Jay Smart
H ?8 f 1986 -

PM.JP

Trfn

(.1) that Boettcher will be using and relying on data,
material and information presented in the Offering Memorandum
furnished to Boettcher by the Company and its employees and
representatives and (ii) that Boettcher does not. assume
responsibility for independently verifying the information in
the Offering Memorandum. The Company hereby represents and
warrants to Boettcher that the Offering Memorandum as
approved by the Company will not contain any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state any material fact
necessary to make the statements ther-in :v r misleading.
.••oettcher understands the confidential nature OL -rAs project
and will work with you to maintain tn^ confidentiality you
require. If any companies, entities, or individuals should
be excluded as potential purchasers due to the
confidentiality of the information, the Company shall
promptly notify Boettcher in writing of these exclusions,
Except for such stated exclusions and the exclusion specified
in paragraph 6, Boettcher shall be allowed tc distribute the
Offering Memorandum to any party that it reasonably deems to
be a prospective purchaser of the Company• All
correspondence from Boettcher to the Company related to the
transaction -shall be marked "Confidential" and delivered to
Reed Watkins as attorney for the Company.
Boettcher shall act as your representative on an exclusive
basis for a period of four months from the date of the
acceptance of this letter by you unless extended by mutual
consent. Boettcher shall take reasonable and diligent action
to complete the sale of the Company on a timely basis and
agrees to give the Company bi-weekly oral updates of its
activities and progress. In this role, except as discussed
in paragraph 6, Boettcher shall be the sole and exclusive
representative of the company in connection with any
negotiations or discussion with any person or entity
concerning any sale and any other acquisition/ consolidation
or merger of the stock or assets of the Company. In order
that Boettcher can best coordinate efforts to effect the
transaction satisfactorily to the Company during the terms of
our retention hereunder, the Company agrees to initiate any
discussions looking toward a possible sale, acquisitionr
consolidation or merger only through Boettcher. In the even!
the Company receives inquiries concerning the type of
transaction dealt with in this letter, you will promptly so
inform us when you become aware of such inquiry. In the
event that a proposed person or entity with whom you
eventually crclud^ "" agreement is referred to us by
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another party, all compensation due such party, which
Boettcher has expressly agreed in writing to pay, shall be
our responsibility. The" Company will be responsible for any
fees or commissions of any other type, including financial,
legal, accounting or other advisers called upon, requested or
retained by the Company, its officers, directors or
Stockholders, and the Company agrees to pay all of its
expenses in connection with any such transaction.
5)

Except as set forth in paragraph 6, Boettcher shall receive a
fee for its services, which to the extent necessary will
include but not be limited to, participation in the
preparation of the Offering Memorandum, identification of a
selling price acceptable to the seller, development of a
marketing plan, a search for and screening of responsible
purchasers, advising you as to the financial aspects of the
proposed transaction, and assisting you in the negotiations
between you and the prospective -purchasers.- This- fee shall
be based on the "Purchase Price" and payable from the Company
in the event of an asset sale, merger, or acquisition or
similar transaction of the Company, or from the Stockholders
in the event of a stock sale, as follows:

U)

•5% of any amount upto-$999,999;- plus

(ii)

4% of any amount from $1,000,000 to $1,999,999; plus

(iii)

3% of any amount from $2,000,000 to $2,999,999; plus

(iv)

2% of any amount from $3,000,000 to $3,999,999; plus

(v) 1% of any amount over $4,000,000.»
For purposes of this agreement, the Purchase Price shall^
include cash, securities, and any corporate earnout received.
by the Company or the Stockholders. If any portion of the
Purchase Price is in the form of debt securities or stock,
then that amount of the Purchase Price shall be based upon
the fair market value of the debt.or equity securities. The
fair market value of equity securities shall be determined as
follows: If any of the securities to be^received are traded
on a registered national exchange the fair market value of
such securities shall be the closing bid price for such
securities on the registered national exchange providing the
primary or largest market in such securities on the last
trading day prior to the day the sale is consummated; if any
of the securities to be received are not traded on a
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shall be the average of the closing bid prices as reported by
the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. for the
previous ten consecutive trading days prior to the day the
sale is consummated*
"Earnout shall be defined as any cash, securities, or other
remuneration received as a result of the future performance
of the Company, or as a result of any noncompete, consulting,
or similar agreements entered into by any stockholder as a
result of the sale*
The final Purchase Price and all other terms and conditions
of any transaction shall be subject to approval of the Board
of directors and, if appropriate, the Stockholders of the
Company,
' 9^

'JVC?

/

6)

7)

8)

The Company has previously contacted certain compani*
through other intermediaries regarding a possible s^le of or
investment in the Company, The names of these entities shall
be provided in writing to Boettcher within £**^Dusiness days
of acceptance of this letter and shall not exceed ten
companies* In the event a transaction of the type
contemplated herein is completed with one of these parties,
Boettcher shall receive a fee of $25,000 for services
rendered* In all other cases, Boettcher shall act as the^
exclusive representative of the Company and if a transaction
is completed with any entity not provided, Boettcher shall be
entitled to the fees specified in paragraph 5. The Company
agrees it will not provide any information prepared by
Boettcher to these parties*
Subject to paragraph 10 below, the fees to Boettcher shall be
payable only if a transaction is closed, and shall be payable
in cash in full at the closing of any such transaction,
provided that any payments which are based on future earnings
or other "earnout" formulas shall be paid to Boettcher at the
time the future payments are received. Any such amounts
shall be added to any amount previously paid in determining
the Purchase Price and applying the above percentage fee.
Except as specifically stated in paragraph 10 of this #
(?0$
agreement, the above-described compensation shall be in fulj^payment for all services rendered by Boettcher & Company^'Snd,
in no event, and regardless of whether or not there is a
closing, shall the Company be liable for any out-of-pocket
expenses, or for the services of others whom Boettcher may
employ to assist in the transaction.
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9)

After termination of this agreement for any reason, Boettcher
will provide you with the list of names of parties we have
contacted and with whom we have had discussions on your
behalf. If within 12 months following the termination of the
agreement, the Company consummates a transaction with any
party which is stated on the aforementioned list, Boettcher
shall be entitled to its full fee as set forth in this
agreement.
This agreement may be terminated by the Company on the one
hand, or by Boettcher on the other hand, at any time by
written notice. In the event of the termination of this
agreement by the Company and the Stockholders together prior
to the four month period referred to in paragraph 4, the
Company shall reimburse'Boettcher for all its direct, .out-ofpocket expenses incurred in connection with this transaction;
provided, however, if Boettcher becomes* entitled to a fee
Jind&r paragraphs 9fof this agreement, credit against that fee
shall be given for any fee paid and expenses reimbursed
pursuant to this paragraph. Such payment of out-of-pocket
expenses shall be due and payable within three days after
notification by Boettcher to the Company to the amount of
expenses incurred.

11) In connection with the performance of the services described
in this letter and any transaction which may arise as a
result of such services, the Company agrees to indemnify
Boettcher, its officers, employees and agents, and each
person, if any, who controls Boettcher within the meaning of
the Federal securities laws, harmless against and from any
and all losses, claims, expenses, damages or liabilities to
which Boettcher or any such 'officer, employee, agent or
person becomes subject in connection with the transaction and
services referred to in this agreement under any of the
Federal or State securities laws or any other statute or
common law or otherwise and to reimburse Boettcher and any
such officer, agent, employee or person .for any legal or
other expenses (including the cost of separate counsel and
any related investigation and preparation) incurred by
Boettcher and any such officer, employee, -agent or person
arising out of or in connection herewith, whether cr not
resulting in any liability insofar as such losses, claims,
damages, expenses or liabilities arise out of or are based
upon any untrue statement or alleged untrue statement of a
material fact contained in the Offering Memorandum, or
otherwise made by the Company, or arise out of or are based
upon the omission or alleged omission to state a material
fact required to be stated or necessary in order to make the
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12) It is understood that if any transaction is completed,
Boettcher shall be entitled, at its expense, to*place an
announcement in such newspapers and periodicals as we desire,
stating that Boettcher has acted as financial advisers in
such transaction. Any such announcement shall be in a fo
reasonably acceptable to the CompanyIf the foregoing represents a correct statement of our
agreement and understanding, please execute this agreement. If
executed and delivered to Boettcher, a binding agreement shall
thereupon exist.
Very truly yours,
BOETTCHER & COMPANY, INC,

C-^Tame^'Bode
Vice President
Corporate Finance Department

G. Michael Moore
Senior Vice President
Corporate Finance Department
The above is hereby acknowledged
and accepted:
WON-DOOR CORPORATION

SA<JU<3jt^^
Office:
Date:
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EXHIBIT *. H

Capital Consultant*. Inc.

May 23, 1986

Kevin Shultz
Drexel Burnham Lambert, Incorporated
131 South Rodeo Drive, Suite 300
Beverly Hills, CA
90212

Dear Kevin:
Tuesday morning, Irv Bird and I met with Reed Watkins to determine
his sales approach for Won-Door Corporation. It was considerably disappointing to us that Reed had decided to pursue Boettcher and Company. Both Irv
and I tried to dissuade Reed of this decision but it was to no avail.
Reed decided that the time factor you and I had discussed was
inopportune. Furthermore, Boettcher had completed its due diligence and had
already prepared its offering memorandum. Therefore, Boettcher was prepared
to begin sales efforts immediately.
He conceded that we were correct in our assessment that Drexel
Burnham had far greater credentials and success in these types of projects;
but he said that he was only giving Boettcher 90 days to perform and should
they fail to perform, he would come back to Drexel Burnham.
Both Irv and I reminded Reed of your comment regarding a shopped
property, but he has made his mind up for the present time. We hope that
you will understand the situation. We were so pleased with our meeting and
hope that you agree with our feeling that there is ground for future
business between our organizations.
We will keep you apprised of the progress with Won-Door. Should
you have any suggestions that you feel would be beneficial to all of us,
we would be most appreciative.
Kindest personal regards,
CAPITAL CONSULTANTS, INC.

Brfyant/ D. Cragun,
President
BDC/dhs
cc:

Irvin D. Bird

EXHIBIT" -L "

Rule 55

UTAH RULES OP CIVIL PROCEDURE

the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the
judgment docket.
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.)
Rule 55. Default.
(a) Default.
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these
rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk
shall enter his default.
(2) Notice to party in default. After the
entry of the default of any party, as provided in
Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in default any notice of
action taken or to be taken or to serve any notice
or paper otherwise required by these rules to be
served on a party to the action or proceeding,
except as provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or
in the event that it is necessary for the court to
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of
damages of the nondefaulting party.
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim
against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a
sum which can hy computation be made certain,
and the defendant has been personally served
otherwise than by publication or by personal service outside of this state, the clerk upon request
of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the
amount due and costs against the defendant, if
he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if
he is not an infant or incompetent person.
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party
entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to
the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court
to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is
necessary to take an account or to determine the
amount of damages or to establish the truth of
any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it
deems necessary and proper.
(c) Setting aside default For good cause shown
the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule apply whether the
party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded
a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a judgment
by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c).
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or
agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be entered against the state of Utah or against an officer or
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the
court.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.)
Rule 56. Summary j u d g m e n t
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
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(b) For defending party, A party against whom a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part
thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time
fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine
issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial
controversy and what material facts are actually and
in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make
an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which
the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the
trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the
court may refuse the application for judgment or may
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be
had or may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of
delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may
be adjudged guilty of contempt.
.

February 20, 1986

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
The Directors and Shareholders of WON-DOOR
CORPORATION, a Utah Corporation, have adopted a plan
to raise funding through either an initial public
offering or a private placement of common stock,
Mr, Reed A. Watkins, Attorney-at-Law, is the
exclusive agent and representative of the Corporation
and its shareholders for this purpose, Mr, Watkins
is fully authorized and empowered to negotiate and
conclude the funding transaction on behalf of the
Corporation and its shareholders.
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Mardi 12, 1986

Mr. Irvin D. Bird, Jr.
The Bepublic Group
185 South Main Street
Suite 1050
Salt Lake Ctiy, Utah 84111
Be: Wbn-Dcor Corporation

Dear Irv:
This letter will conf ix» cur « ™ a S ^
f y ^ ^ c !
should The Bepublic Group througn i t s contacts rum a P

msnt of Vfon-Door Corporation stock.
<- ^ X._J- ; c c7 w 000 for 176,000 shares of the
The anount of the funding i s $7'392,00U ior
,
i ^ ^ s o f the
Won-Dcor stock. This i s coipited a t $42.00 per share.
Snart family are the s e l l e r s .
Hcn-Dcor w i l l have 800,000 f ™ ^ g S ^ g . ^ , S T S a S
of one class) after completion of f ^ ^ ^ ^ r i s
adjusting
represents twenty-two (22%) percent t h e r e o f ^ r e S U corporate
i t s executive bonus plan which ^ . ^ f - S ^ S pro fornTrinancial
earniixjs over the artount j e t far* £ j ^ e 30?1986 after-tax earnings
Information. Won-Dcor anticipates i s June JU, ^
to be not l e s s than $2,688,000.
I t i s Wbn-Door's intent t o becor* a public cncsny within a f i v e
year period.
Upon cc*pletion and execution of *******
™ ^ £ * £ £ *
BepubSc Group's contact<s), » ? » S * ^ » g g S ' £ £ c w n ^ o s t T To
The Republic Group. The ^ ^ c J ^ ^ 1 ^ ^ j ^ u l d be submitted
avoid misunderstaming regarding contacts, names sno
and their status qualified in advance.
"Truly Yours,

Reed" A. Watkins
PW/bt

EXHIBIT"

W^ ^kpuhlic d r n u p
Way 21, .1986

Heed A. Watkins
Watkins & Faber
2102 E. 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Dear Reed,
This letter serves as formal notice to you of our list of prospective
buyers for the Won Dcor Corporation.
1. Wes Kay Corp.
2. Capital Consultants Inc.
3. The Republic Group
4. The Dallas Corp.
5. Leucadia Inc.
6. Weyerhaeuser Corp.
7. Masco
8. Peachtree Door, A Division of Indal Corp.
9. Armstrong World Corp.
10. Teledyne Corp.
11. Daninick & Daninick
We appreciate your desire to work with us and hope that you knew that we
are working diligently to effect the sale of your client! s ccrpany.
Personal Regards,

Frederick W. Volcansek
Vice President
The Recublic Grouo

cc: Bryant D. Cragun
Irvin D. Bird Jr.
Mark E. McSwain
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August 20, 1986

Reed A. Watkins, Esq,
Watkins & Faber
2102 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84109
RE:

The Republic Group/Won-Door

Dear Mr, Watkins:
I am writing in confirmation of our telephone
conversation of last week and your assurance that you
recognized your obligation to The Republic Group if Leucadia or
any of the other qualified ten listed companies acquires an
interest in Won-Door.
I have reviewed the documents and this matter with Irv
Bird and after confirmation with you, my undertanding is that:
If one of the qualified companies, including Leucadia,
purchases an interest in Won-Door, The Republic Group
is entitled to a commission. The commission is based
on a fee of $250,000 per 22% of Won-Door purchased,
thus if 100% of Won-Door is purchased by one of the
qualified corporations then The Republic Group should
be entitled to a $1,000,000 fee.
If that does not comport with your understanding I would
appreciate hearing immediately so that I can discuss this
matter with my client.
My understanding is that Leucadia has been negotiating
very seriously with Won-Door and that last week after examining
the books they made an offer. If this offer is accepted The
Republic Group would be entitled to its fees.

C V L J I O I T «*

Reed A. Watkins, Esq.
Page 2
August 20, 1986
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. I will
assure my client that there is no misunderstanding on the
agreement.
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Dttmt, Colorado 80201-0***
(303) G2S-8OQ0

Mr. Jay Smart
Chairman
Won-Door Corporation
1865 South 3480 West
Salt Lake City, Utah

84104

Dear Jay:
The purpose of this letter is to confirm in writing the
understanding between Boettcher & Company, Inc. ("Boettcher") and
Won-Door Corporation ("the Company") whereby Boettcher will act
as exclusive representative for the Company to arrange and to
negotiate, on such terms as may be "acceptable to the Board of
Directors of the Company, and subject to the approval of the
Stockholders of the Company, if necessary or appropriate, a
possible transaction with an appropriate third party concerning
either:
(i)

the sale of all or a portion of the outstanding stock or
assets of the Company, or

(ii)

the acquisition, consolidation or merger of the company.

Our arrangements with you in connection therewith shall be
as follows:
1)

Boettcher shall commence its activity following
acceptance and approval of this agreement by the
Company,

2)

Boettcher shall work with the Company in the preparation
of a memorandum (the "Offering Memorandum"). This
Offering Memorandum will describe and analyze the
Company, its operations, management, current financial
data and other appropriate information. The Offering
Memorandum will be used in discussions with prospective
purchasers and its form and content shall be subject to
approval by the Company. Subject to the terms hereof,
the Company and Boettcher shall have the unrestricted
right to use the Offering Memorandum during the term of
this agreement. The Company understands and confirms

Mr. Jay Smart
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(.i) tnax: noenrcner w i n De using and relying on data,
material and information presented in the Offering Memorandum
furnished to Boettcher by the Company and its employees and
representatives and (ii) that Boettcher does not*assume
responsibility for independently verifying the information in
the Offering Memorandum. The Company hereby represents and
warrants to Boettcher that the Offering Memorandum as
approved by the Company will not contain any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state any material fact
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.
3)

Boettcher understands the confidential nature of this project
and will work with you to maintain the confidentiality you
require. If any companies, entities, or individuals should
be excluded as potential purchasers due to the
confidentiality of the information, the Company shall
promptly notify Boettcher in writing of these exclusions.
Except for such stated exclusions and the exclusion specified
in paragraph 6, Boettcher shall be allowed tc distribute the
Offering Memorandum to any party that it reasonably deems to
be a prospective purchaser of the Company. All
correspondence from Boettcher to the Company related to the.
transaction shall be marked-"Confidential" and delivered to
Reed Watkins as attorney for the Company.

4)

Boettcher shall act as your representative on an exclusive
basis for a period of four months from the date of the
acceptance of this letter by you unless extended by mutual
consent. Boettcher shall take reasonable and diligent action
to complete the sale of the Company on a timely basis and
agrees to give the Company bi-weekly oral updates of its
activities and progress. In this role, except as discussed
in paragraph 6, Boettcher shall be the sole and exclusive
representative of the company in connection with any
negotiations or discussion with any person or entity
concerning any sale and any other acquisition, consolidation
or merger of the stock or assets of the Company. In order
that Boettcher can best coordinate efforts to effect the
transaction satisfactorily to the Company during the terms of
our retention hereunder, the Company agrees to initiate any
discussions looking toward a possible sale, acquisition,
consolidation or merger only through Boettcher. In the event
the Company receives inquiries concerning the type of
transaction dealt with in this letter, you will promptly so
inform us when you become aware of such inquiry. In the
event that a proposed person or entity with whom you
eventually conclude an agreement is referred to us by

Mr. Jay Smart
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another party, all compensation due such party, which
Boettcher has expressly agreed in writing to pay, shall be
our responsibility. The Company will be responsible for any
fees or commissions of any other type, including financial,
legal, accounting or other advisers called upon, requested or
retained by the- Company, its officers, directors or
Stockholders, and the Company agrees to pay all of its
expenses in connection with any such transaction.
b]

Except as set forth in paragraph 6, Boettcher shall receive a
fee for its services, which to the extent necessary will
include but not be limited to, participation in the
preparation of the Offering Memorandum, identification of a
selling price acceptable to the seller, development of a
marketing plan, a search for and screening of responsible
purchasers, advising you as to the financial aspects of the
proposed transaction, and assisting you in the negotiations
between you and the prospective -purchasers.- This fee shall
be based on the "Purchase Price" and payable from the Company
in the event of an asset sale, merger, or acquisition or
similar transaction of the Company, or from the Stockholders
in the event of a stock sale, as follows:
(i) -5% of any amount up to V yyr1, JJ9; ( Las
(ii)

4* of any amount from $1,000,000 (3 $1,999,999; plus

(iii)

]l of any amount from $2,000,000 > n $2 f 999 # 999; plus

(i\ i

» of any amount from $ 3 , i n UiM

(v)

H of any amount over $4,000,000,

?3,H^,

jq<J

; plus

For purposes of this agreement, the Purchase Price shall^
include cash, securities, and any corporate earnout received.
by the Company or the Stockholders. If any portion of the
Purchase Price is in the form of debt securities or stock,
then that amount of the Purchase Price shall be based upon
the fair market value of the debt .or equity securities. The
fair market value of equity securities shall be determined as
follows: If any of the securities to be received are traded
on a registered national exchange the fair market value of
such securities shall be the closing bid price for such
securities on the registered national exchange providing the
primary or largest market in such securities on the last
trading day prior to the day the sale is consummated; if any
of
the securities
toA<*^UTx<r*r*a.
be receivedKnf
areafo
notminted
traded inonthe
a over—the-^^±„U*~^A
***± +-A/^«r»i
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shall be the average of the closing bid prices as reported by
the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. for the
previous ten consecutive trading days prior to the day the
sale is consummated•
"Earnout shall be defined as any cash, securities, or other
remuneration received as a result of the future performance
of the Company, or as a result of any noncompete, consulting,
or similar agreements entered into by any stockholder as a
result of the sale.
The final Purchase Price and all other terms and conditions
of any transaction shall be subject to approval of the Board
of directors and, if appropriate, the Stockholders of the
Company,

* $~?£?

/

fi) The Company has previously contacted certain companies-'
through other intermediaries regarding a possible s^le o± or
investment in the Company. The names of these a*ftities shall
be provided in writing to Boettcher within iw^DUsiness days
of acceptance of this letter and shall not exceed ten
companies. In the event a transaction of the type
contemplated herein is completed with one of these parties,
Boettcher shall receive a fee of $25,000 for services
rendered. In all other cases, Boettcher shall act as the
exclusive representative of the Company and if a transaction
is completed with any entity not provided, Boettcher shall be
entitled to the fees specified in paragraph 5. The Company
agrees it will not provide any information prepared by
Boettcher to these parties,
7) Subject to paragraph 10 below, the fees to Boettcher shall be
payable only if a transaction is closed, and shall be payable
in cash in full atfr-heclosing of any such transaction,
provided that any payments which are based on future earnings
or other "earnout* formulas shall be paid to Boettcher at the
time the future payments are received. Any such amounts^
shall be added to any amount previously paid in determining
the Purchase Price and applying the above percentage fee.
\\

Except as specifically stated in paragraph 10 of this^
ff^$
agreement, the above-described compensation shall be in ful^payment for all services rendered by Boettcher & Company^^Snd,
in no event, and regardless of whether or not there is a
closing, shall the Company be liable for any out-of-pocket
expenses r u for the services of others whom Boettcher may
employ to assist in the transaction.
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After termination of this agreement for any reason, Boettcher
will provide you with the list of names of parties we have
contacted and with whom we have had discussions on your
behalf. If within 12 months following the termination of the
agreement, the Company consummates a transaction with any
party which is stated on the aforementioned list, Boettcher
shall be entitled to its full fee as-set forth in this
agreement.
This agreement may be terminated by the Company on the one
hand, or by Boettcher on the other hand, at any time by
written notice. In the event of the termination of this
agreement by the Company and the Stockholders together prior
to the four month period referred to in paragraph 4, the
Company shall .reimburse'Boettcher for all its direct, .out-ofpocket expenses incurred in connection.with this transaction;
provided, however, if Boettcher becomes*entitled to a fee
undgx paragraphs 9fof this agreement, credit against that fee
shall be given for any fee paid and expenses reimbursed
pursuant to this paragraph. Such payment of out-of-pocket
expenses shall be due and payable within three days after
notification by Boettcher to the Company to the amount of
expenses incurred.

11) In connection with the performance of the services described
in this letter and any transaction which may arise as a
result of such services, the Company agrees to indemnify
Boettcher, its officers, employees and agents, and each
person, if any, who controls Boettcher within the meaning of
the Federal securities laws, harmless against and from any
and all losses, claims, expenses, damages or liabilities to
which Boettcher or any such 'officer, employee, agent or
person becomes subject in connection with the transaction and
services referred to in this agreement under any of the
Federal or State securities laws or any other statute or
common law or otherwise and to reimburse Boettcher and any
such officer, • agent, employee or person .for any legal or
other expenses (including the cost of separate counsel and
any related investigation and preparation) incurred by
Boettcher and any such officer, employee, -agent or person
arising out of or in connection herewith, whether cr not
resulting in any liability insofar as such losses, claims,
damages, expenses or liabilities arise out of or are based
upon any untrue statement or alleged untrue statement of a
material fact contained in the Offering Memorandum, or
otherwise made by the Company, or arise out of or are based
upon the omission or alleged omission to state a material
fact required to be stated or necessary in order to make the
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12) It is understood that if any transaction is completedf
Boettcher shall be entitled, at its expense, to-"place an
announcement in such newspapers and periodicals as we desire.
stating that Boettcher has acted as financial advisers in
such transaction. Any such announcement shall be in a form j<~c'
reasonably acceptable to the Company*
If the foregoing represents a correct statement of oar
agreement and understanding, please execute this agreement. If
executed and delivered to Boettcher, a binding agreement shall
thereupon exist.
Very truly yours,
BOETTCHER & COMPANY, INC.

C^Tame^ Bode
Vice President
Corporate Finance Department

$ rf.r-r
G. Michael Moore
Senior Vice President
Corporate Finance Department
The above is hereby acknowledged
and accepted:
WON-DOOR CORPORATION

By:
Off ice:
Date:

/Hle*Ol-U/

^<£=c=

i'lu .

-• *^ /

J. -^ O U

Fred Vclcansek
The Republic Group
185 South State, Suite 1050
Srtit 7-*A* ritv, TJT
84113
Fred:
Kv t e n c j y ' j o e s £•::•£" s e l l i n c "rrOii—T^or would be t h e
* • - .-* 1 -

- •• ••*

following:

-: »- •; ^ , -

-j

ri.-

3,

'.-ever^^^o b u v - o u t ; where x.he f o u r <~>r u s p u t t o g e t h e r
z.hc. r;:ndr; n r ~ B i l l I c h c - end I ccrr.c :r. cr.c r a i s e t h e

~ —

7 * ..i Vciv UII«.:CJHI I"(J t t a b l e wi i.n i.he i i s i . tif <:i*iiuurinies c h a t
^ ::uvC chos-in C-AAIV Lc-j-ause I know so l i t t l e an-i-.iv. t h e i n d u s t r y
does.

2.

.-1.-.SCC C o r p .

3.

*.7i,in 7?d2.Ler Ccr*"*.

.. *» .

CwCr-ii

-..*-..

Pacific

I v i • i be i n I d s ho a : :
7ue--ay ..orbing.
I would l\-\
a t J::?.z tir.vi-.

»."•• . ; " d a y and i : i l i be back on
:
:c v i s i t w i t n you, I r v , and ft-. •* -.
VT:V t r u l y

yours,

EXHIBIT",

n

Capital Consultants. Inc.

May 2 3 , 1986

Kevin S h u l t z
D r e x e l Burnham L a m b e r t , I n c o r p o r a t e d
131 South Rodeo D r i v e , S u i t e 300
B e v e r l y H i l l s , CA
90212

Dear Kevin:
Tuesday morning, Irv Bird and I met with Reed Watkins to determine
his sales approach for Won-Door Corporation. It was considerably disappointing to us that Reed had decided
to pursue Boettcher and Company. Both Irv
and I tried to dissuade Reed of this decision but it was to no avail.
Reed decided that the time factor you and I had discussed was
inopportune. Furthermore, Boettcher had completed its due diligence and had
already prepared its offering memorandum. Therefore, Boettcher was prepared
to begin sales efforts immediately.
He conceded that we were correct in our assessment that Drexel
Burnham had far greater credentials and success in these types of projects;
but he said that he was only giving Boettcher 90 days to perform and should
they fail to perform, he would come back to Drexel Burnham.
Both Irv and I reminded Reed of your comment regarding a shopped
property, but he has made his mind up for the present time. We hope that
you will understand the situation. We were so pleased with our meeting and
hope that you agree with our feeling that there is ground for future
business between our organizations.
We will keep you apprised of the progress with Won-Door. Should
you have any suggestions that you feel would be beneficial to all of us,
we would be most appreciative.
Kindest personal regards,
CAPITAL CONSULTANTS, INC.

Bryant/ D. Cragun,
Presidrent
BDC/dhs
cc:

EXHIBIT".

Irvin D. Bird
Ma r V- U

Mr ^ua T n
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Rule 55

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the
judgment docket.
(Amended effective J a n u a r y 1, 1985.)
Rule 55. Default.
(a) Default.
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these
rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk
shall enter his default.
(2) Notice to party in default. After the
entry of the default of any party, as provided in
Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in default any notice of
action taken or to be taken or to serve any notice
or paper otherwise required by these rules to be
served on a party to the action or proceeding,
except as provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or
in the event that it is necessary for the court to
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of
damages of the nondefaulting party.
(b) J u d g m e n t . Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(1) By t h e clerk. When the plaintiffs claim
against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a
sum which can by computation be made certain,
and the defendant has been personally served
otherwise than by publication or by personal service outside of this state, the clerk upon request
of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the
amount due and costs against the defendant, if
he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if
he is not an infant or incompetent person.
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party
entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to
the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court
to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is
necessary to take an account or to determine the
amount of damages or to establish the truth of
any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it
deems necessary and proper.
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown
the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claima n t s . The provisions of this rule apply whether the
party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded
a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a judgment
by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c).
(e) Judgment a g a i n s t the state or officer or
a g e n c y thereof. No judgment by default shall be entered against the state of Utah or against an officer or
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the
court.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.)
Rule 56. S u m m a r y judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.

4ys

(b) For defending p a r t y . A party against whom a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part
thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time
fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine
issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial
controversy and what material facts are actually and
in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make
an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which
the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the
trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against him.
(0 When affidavits are unavailable. Should it
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the
court may refuse the application for judgment or may
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be
had or may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of
delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may
be adjudged guilty of contempt.
y.

